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RESPONSE TO VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Fred Wertheimer *
Alexandra T.V. Edsall **
I. INTRODUCTION
Our response to Ackerman and Ayres's important new book'
includes three parts. First, we argue that, in their critique of the
"old paradigm," Ackerman and Ayres misstate the vitality of the
traditional approach.2 Indeed, we find that they incorporate more
of that model than they suggest-including public financing,' a
ban on soft money,4 a prohibition of corporate and union cam-
paign contributions and expenditures,5 and reform of the Federal
Election Commission ("FEC")6-confirming that many of its ele-
ments are indispensable to any program that seeks to limit the
influence of money over government decisions.
Second, we review that aspect of their proposal that departs
sharply from the traditional approach: the secret donation booth.7
Here, instead of disclosing the identities of campaign donors, the
goal is to keep them secret-from the recipients as well as the
public-in order to withhold the information that enables politi-
• President and CEO of Democracy 21. B.A., 1959, University of Michigan; LL.B.,
1962, Harvard Law School.
** Legal Consultant to Democracy 21. B.A., 1989, Harvard College; J.D., 1994, Har-
vard Law School.
1. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 210-12 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 16).
4. See id. at 203-05 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10).
5. Id. at 204 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10(h)).
6. Id. at 194-97 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 6).
7. See infra Part III.
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cians to favor their donors.8 In the discussion below, we review
this proposal, expressing our concern that efforts to prevent poli-
ticians from identifying their donors would fail, resulting in the
worst-case scenario in which politicians and donors have close re-
lations built on known large contributions, but the public is kept
unaware.
Third, we close with a discussion of the recently enacted Bipar-
tisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA").9 In the course of their cri-
tique, Ackerman and Ayres contrast their proposal to what they
characterize as "the alternative-the effort by Senators McCain
and Feingold to breathe new life into the old paradigm." 10 Since
publication of Ackerman and Ayres's book, that effort has re-
sulted in the successful passage of the BCRA. Of course, the "al-
ternative" to Ackerman and Ayres's proposal is not the BCRA,
but the BCRA accompanied by other key elements of the tradi-
tional reform program, including public financing and reform of
the FEC. So compared, the traditional approach offers a compel-
ling response to the need to "insulat[e] ... democratic politics
from the rule of big money."" That said, the BCRA taken alone is
crucial, both to the traditional approach and to Ackerman and
Ayres's program. The BCRA responds to evasive maneuvers that
have enabled the political parties and large donors to channel
money into the campaign finance system outside the regulatory
framework. Unless these maneuvers are prohibited, they will al-
low a bypass of any system that seeks to control the source or
amount of money spent on federal elections, including Ackerman
and Ayres's own. Given the necessity of the BCRA's measures to
any program of campaign finance reform and the current consti-
tutional challenge to the new law,12 we discuss the operation and
constitutionality of its principal elements in some detail. 13
8. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 25.
9. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) [hereinafter BCRA]; see also infra Part IV.
10. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 53.
11. Id. at 13.
12. A constitutional challenge to the BCRA is now under review in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia. See McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-0582 (D.D.C. filed Mar.
27, 2002).
13. See infra Part IV.
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II. THE "OLD PARADIGM"
Ackerman and Ayres endorse a central goal of campaign fi-
nance reform: to prevent politicians from being beholden-and
potentially answerable-to large donors and special interests. 4
As they reason, the legitimacy of our democracy depends on our
representatives not paying special heed to major donors.15 Ac-
kerman and Ayres correctly note that the traditional approach to
campaign finance reform includes three principal elements to ad-
dress this goal: limits on the source and amount of campaign con-
tributions, disclosure of campaign contributions and expendi-
tures, and public financing of candidates. 6 Taken together, these
measures offer a compelling response to the need to prevent
money from swaying officeholders. Limits prevent officeholders
from becoming or appearing obligated to major donors. Disclosure
helps enable enforcement of these limits by enhancing scrutiny of
politician-donor relations. Public financing reduces incentives to
pursue private money and dependence on that money.
Ackerman and Ayres err in suggesting that the failings of the
campaign finance system, which are many, signal inherent flaws
in this approach. 7 To the contrary, these failings reflect under-
enforcement by the regulators and partial adoption by Congress-
problems that would undermine Ackerman and Ayres's proposal
as well. From early on, campaign finance reform has been ham-
pered by the FEC's notoriously weak enforcement. 8 In the most
prominent of its failings, as detailed below, the FEC has allowed
the political parties to raise and spend unlimited amounts of un-
regulated soft money, which has enabled widespread circumven-
tion of the contribution limits and the presidential public financ-
ing system. 9 Congress, too, has hindered campaign finance
reform, adopting only limited measures and rarely taking action
to stop evasion.
With effective enforcement and wholesale enactment, the tradi-
tional approach would significantly cabin the influence of large
14. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 13.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 3-4.
17. See id. at 3.
18. See infra Part II.D.
19. See infra Part W.A.
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donors, restoring integrity to our democratic system. As we detail
below, Ackerman and Ayres's charges against the traditional ap-
proach are misplaced.
A. Limits
Ackerman and Ayres's rejection of limits is more qualified than
they suggest. While the authors discard the current limits on in-
dividual contributions, they retain another type of limit, also cru-
cial to the traditional approach. Since 1907, Congress has banned
the use of corporate treasury funds for contributions to federal
candidates and their parties,2" and since the 1940s, Congress has
prohibited the use of union dues in connection with federal elec-
tions.2 As the Supreme Court of the United States has explained,
the restriction on corporate campaign contributions and spending
counters "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corpo-
rate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas."22 Ackerman and
Ayres follow the traditional approach in prohibiting corporate and
union donations.23 In addition, Ackerman and Ayres preserve the
current cap of $5,000 on individual contributions to political ac-
tion committees ("PACs"); and, while they raise them substan-
tially, they preserve caps on individual contributions to candi-
dates and parties.24 Moreover, Ackerman and Ayres authorize
candidates to raise money outside of their secret donation booth
during the exploratory phase of their campaigns, but impose ad-
ditional limits for this phase.25
20. Federal Corrupt Practices (Tillman) Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
21. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 304, § 313, 61 Stat.
136, 159 (1947); see also FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982);
Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 415-16 (1972) (noting that
Congress barred labor unions from making campaign expenditures in order to "eliminate
the effect of aggregated wealth on federal elections"); United States v. United Auto. Work-
ers and Cong. of Indus. Org. (UAW-CIO), 352 U.S. 567, 578-79 (1957) (detailing congres-
sional intent behind the proscription on electoral activity funded from the "huge war
chests being maintained by labor unions") (quoting To Regulate Labor Organizations:
Hearings on H.R. 804 and H.R. 1483 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Labor,
78th Cong. 2 (1943) (statement of Rep. G.W. Landis)).
22. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
23. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 204-05 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10(h)).
24. Id. at 204 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10(e)-(f)).
25. Id. at 206-07 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 12)).
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Ackerman and Ayres substantially raise the basic limits on in-
dividual contributions to candidates and parties.26 In doing so,
they argue that limits have led to a "dismal cycle" in which limits
are continuously overcome by loopholes.2 ' Ackerman and Ayres
argue that
until we change the incentives of big donors and ambitious politi-
cians, we will not get the heart of the problem,...
... [Measures to close loopholes] will generate pathologies of
[their] own. Politicians and donors will be increasingly obliged to
master a complex rulebook, and their knowledge of the rules will be
tested under very difficult conditions....
The predictable-if unintended-result, is the criminalization of
politics.
28
We take these charges in turn.
In characterizing campaign finance reform as a "dismal cycle,"
Ackerman and Ayres repeat a common charge against campaign
finance reform. According to this criticism, reform is futile, be-
cause money, like water, "will always find its own level." 29 While
echoing the charge, Ackerman and Ayres correctly note that it is
"exaggerated."" Indeed, contrary to the image presented by the
critics of a perpetual and futile race to plug loopholes, the re-
cently enacted BCRA represents the first time in more than two
decades that Congress has plugged loopholes in campaign finance
laws. Unlike tax laws or accounting standards, which are rou-
tinely revised to take account of evasion, Congress has generally
met loopholes in campaign finance laws with inaction or even
tacit satisfaction. The FEC, moreover, has regularly opened,
rather than closed, loopholes.
Ultimately, effective enforcement is the answer to charges of
futility, and it is equally critical to Ackerman and Ayres's pro-
posal. As they acknowledge of their own proposal, without over-
haul of the FEC, "we will be writing yet another chapter in the
sorry history of reform."31
26. Id. at 116.
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id. at 46.
29. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999).
30. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 8.
31. Id. at 128.
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Ackerman and Ayres further challenge contribution limits on
the ground that they foster a "proliferating net of legalisms" that
enmesh ordinary citizens in "a host of complex and obscure rules
threatening severe punishments."32 By contrast, their proposal
includes a "basic rule, easily understood by everybody: Never give
or accept gifts that haven't passed through the secret donation
booth."33 True, they have extensive "regulations of last resort,"34
but these "concern a few big givers" who "can readily afford hiring
lawyers and accountants to keep clear of the stratospheric limits
imposed on their activities. 35
This charge that the current system is more complex and diffi-
cult to enforce than Ackerman and Ayres's proposal is puzzling.
Each model includes a primary rule likely to affect ordinary citi-
zens: current law places a limit of $2,000 on individual contribu-
tions to candidates,36 and Ackerman and Ayres's model channels
all contributions through the secret donation booth.3 ' Beyond
these basic rules, both systems include a number of rules de-
signed to govern the behavior of sophisticated political players.
These rules, among others, regulate corporate and union giving,
ensure that neither the political parties nor interest groups raise
money outside the system to use on behalf of candidates, and
regulate PACs.3 1 On these dimensions, Ackerman and Ayres's
"regulations of last resort" are at least equal in complexity to the
traditional approach.39
Moreover, Ackerman and Ayres's approach includes a number
of rules more likely to ensnare ordinary citizens than current law.
For instance, to prevent bundling of donations by PACs-the
practice in which PACs collect and channel multiple donations
from individuals in order to concentrate their influence-
"[d]onors can't give their checks to anybody for inspection or col-
lection, but must go to the post office themselves."" In addition,
32. Id. at 52.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 184.
35. Id. at 52.
36. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 307(a), 116 Stat. 81, 102 (2002) (to be codified at
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)).
37. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 199 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(a)).
38. See id. at 184-85.
39. See id.; see also id. at 111-27.
40. Id. at 97.
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Ackerman and Ayres give vouchers worth fifty dollars to all regis-
tered voters who request them and require voters to donate these
vouchers in the secret donation booth, away from public scru-
tiny.41 Ackerman and Ayres consider it unlikely that politicians
would engage in the "complex and risky enterprise" of buying
vouchers on the black market.42 We, however, are less confident.
As the recent scandal involving false signatures on D.C. Mayor
Anthony Williams's nomination papers suggests,43 at the very
least, some campaign workers could be expected to violate the law
in pursuit of vouchers. Such actions could involve significant
numbers of citizen voucher-holders in illegal transactions.
Ultimately, any campaign finance system that regulates the
source of campaign money will necessarily have some complexity.
Under the current system, as history shows, it is not well-
meaning innocents who typically risk running afoul of these pro-
visions, but strategically aggressive players.44
In their criticism of contribution limits, Ackerman and Ayres
also assert that limits do not "change the incentives of big donors
and ambitious politicians," while their proposal does.4" We will
argue below that their proposal may not change the incentives
that have fueled close relations between politicians and big do-
nors. 46 Moreover, when assessing incentives, the appropriate
comparison is not between Ackerman and Ayres's proposal and
contribution limits, but between their proposal and alternative
proposals taken as a whole. Traditional reform proposals include
comprehensive public financing of candidates. With public fund-
ing at the level Ackerman and Ayres provide-approximately $3
billion per year 47 -these traditional proposals would certainly al-
ter politicians' incentives to pursue private money.
41. See id. at 67.
42. Id. at 68.
43. Christine B. Whelan, Letters, Not Levers, Sway Washington Race: Denied a Spot
on Election Ballot, D.C. Mayoral Incumbent Goes from Shoo-In to Write-In, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 20, 2002, at A4.
44. See, e.g., PROJECT FEC, No BARK, NO BITE, No POINT: THE CASE FOR CLOSING THE
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION AND ESTABLISHING A NEW SYSTEM FOR ENFORCING THE
NATION'S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 87-91 (2002) [hereinafter NO BARK, No BITE] (re-
counting the use of soft money in the 1996 presidential race under high-level direction,
FEC staff recommendation to take action, and FEC refusal to do so), available at
http://www.reforminstitute.org/cgi-data/article/files/30.shtml.
45. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 46.
46. See infra Part III.
47. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 91.
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B. Public Financing
Another principal element of traditional campaign finance re-
form proposals is public financing." Here, there is significant
common ground between Ackerman and Ayres's proposal and
what they call the "old paradigm."49 Both proposals recognize that
public financing is essential to curtail the influence of special-
interest money and to promote competition by making resources
available to challengers.5 0 They differ, however, in the mechanism
to distribute public funds. Most public financing models, includ-
ing the current system for funding presidential elections, use
matching and/or block grants to distribute funds.5 Ackerman and
Ayres instead distribute public financing through vouchers avail-
able to all registered voters. 2 As they argue, this method "democ-
ratiz[es] ... campaign finance" by "invit[ing] millions to take a
small but active role throughout the election campaign."'3
That said, the traditional approach offers many of the benefits
that Ackerman and Ayres claim as exclusive to their model. In
urging that their model offers a sharp contrast to traditional pub-
lic funding models, Ackerman and Ayres assert three principal
differences. 4 First, while traditional models are "centralized" and
"alienate citizens from funding decisions," their model lets citi-
zens direct the flow of funding. 5 Second, while traditional models
favor incumbents by setting a high threshold that bars challeng-
48. RICHARD BRIFFAULT, THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., DOLLARS AND
DEMOCRACY: A BLUEPRINT FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 99 (2000).
49. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 3.
50. See id. at 19; BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 7-8, 100, 102-03, 105; Richard Brif-
fault, Point/ Counterpoint: Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
563, 568-72 (1999); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitar-
ian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 45-47
(1996); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Supe-
riority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1192-93 (1994);
Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring
the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1149-54 (1994).
51. See BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 107-08; Hasen, supra note 50, at 27-30 (Richard
Hasen, however, joins Ackerman and Ayres in advancing a voucher-based program);
Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 50, at 1192; Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 50, at 1150.
52. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 14, 142 (identifying the vouchers as Patriot
dollars).
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 9.
55. Id. at 3, 156 (describing how citizens will direct the flow of campaign money).
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ers from receiving funds, their model does not.5 6 Third, while tra-
ditional models entrench existing parties, their model leaves all
parties equally free to make their case for funding to the elector-
ate. These contrasts mischaracterize the traditional model.
Ackerman and Ayres's first criticism is that traditional public
funding models "hand[ ] a pot of money to bureaucrats, who are
supposed to dole it out by referring to criteria established by a
statute."8 Contrary to this charge of bureaucratic control, alter-
native public financing models distribute much or all of their
funding through matching grants, which let citizens direct the
flow of funding.59 The current system for presidential public fund-
ing, for instance, provides all public primary funding through
matching grants-matching the first $250 of any contribution to a
qualifying candidate6°-and other proposals from the "traditional"
camp likewise provide for all funding through matching grants.61
It is true that the current presidential system provides funding
for the general election through block grants.62 At this stage, the
major party candidates (those whose parties received at least 25%
of the vote in the previous presidential election) each receive an
equal block grant meant to cover the full costs of the general
campaign." A minor party candidate (whose party received be-
tween 5 and 25% of the vote in the previous presidential election)
receives a block grant that is a fraction of the major party grant,
based on the ratio of the minor party candidate's votes in the pre-
vious election to the average number of votes for candidates of the
major parties.64
Giving block, rather than matching, grants to fund the general
election certainly reduces citizen control over the flow of money.
But here, two of Ackerman and Ayres's goals collide. As they rec-
ognize, incumbents have a natural fundraising advantage.65 This
advantage arises in part from an incumbent's ability to favor or
56. Id. at 3, 18-19.
57. Id. at 3, 20.
58. Id. at 19.
59. See sources cited supra note 50 and accompanying text.
60. See 26 U.S.C. § 9033(b)(3)-(4) (2000).
61. See, e.g., BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 29.
62. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (2000).
63. Id. §§ 9002(6), 9004(a)(1).
64. Id. §§ 9002(7), 9004(a)(2).
65. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 19, 156-58.
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disfavor donors-which Ackerman and Ayres believe they will
eliminate through the secret donation booth.66 Even assuming
this is so, incumbents will retain a fundraising advantage on the
basis of their name recognition, regular contacts with and ser-
vices for their constituents, and great potential for being re-
elected. 7 The presidential block grant neutralizes this advantage
by giving the incumbent and challenger equal amounts of money
and limiting their spending to these funds.6" Indeed, the system
has been credited with "offset[ting] the built-in edge of incum-
bents in the general election."69 For example, challengers won in
three of the five publicly funded presidential elections in which
an incumbent ran.7 °
Ackerman and Ayres further charge that traditional public
funding programs favor incumbents by imposing high thresholds
for eligibility. 71 To the contrary, the presidential funding model
not only aids challengers by equalizing resources during the gen-
eral election,72 but it also makes it possible for many non-
incumbents to mount campaigns during the primary.73 Indeed,
the current system solves the threshold problem at the primary
election stage with relative ease and in accordance with democ-
ratic principles.74 In order to receive matching grants, a candidate
must raise at least $5,000 in each of at least twenty states in in-
crements no greater than $250.7' This system has resulted in a
wide field of primary competitors with public financing, and there
is no evidence that any significant candidate has been shut out by
this threshold.76 Presidential funding has contributed substan-
tially to many non-incumbent candidates, including Bill Clinton
and Pat Buchanan in 1992, Jesse Jackson in 1984 and 1988,
George H.W. Bush in 1980, and Jimmy Carter in 1976.77 In 2000,
66. Id. at 158.
67. Id. at 38.
68. See 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(1) (providing that "[t]he eligible candidates of each major
party in a presidential election shall be entitled to equal payments").
69. BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 103.
70. Id.
71. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 19.
72. See 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(1) (providing that major party candidates will receive
"equal payments").
73. BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 103.
74. See id.
75. 26 U.S.C. § 9033(b)(3)-(4) (2000).
76. BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 103.
77. Id. (citing ANTHONY CORRADO, PAYING FOR PRESIDENTS: PUBLIC FINANCING IN
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nine candidates were eligible for public funding, including De-
mocratic candidates Al Gore and Bill Bradley, and Republican
candidates Pat Buchanan, Alan Keyes, Lyndon LaRouche, Gary
Bauer, Dan Quayle, John McCain, and Elizabeth Dole.7"
Finally, Ackerman and Ayres express concern that traditional
funding programs entrench the major parties.79 The current
presidential funding system, however, appropriately funds third
parties in proportion to their electoral strength. 0 As noted above,
primary candidates can receive funding without regard to party.
81
For the general elections, major party candidates receive larger
grants than third party candidates, 2 but third parties are given
money in accordance with their past electoral strength. 3 It is
worth considering revisions to the system that would take into
account current strength, rather than relying exclusively on past
performance, in awarding funds to third party candidates.8 4
Overall, however, the present system is reasonably neutral as to
third parties.
True, the campaign finance system does not promote third par-
ties, but, as Ackerman and Ayres appear to agree, that is not its
role. 5 As they write, "lelven far-reaching changes in campaign fi-
nance will not repeal the basic electoral logic that generates two
major parties." 6 The U.S. electoral system, for reasons unrelated
to campaign finance, strongly favors two parties.8 7 As "Duverger's
Law" explains, the U.S. electoral system of choosing representa-
tives by majority rule on a single ballot predictably results in a
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 43-44 (1993)).
78. Press Release, FEC, Buchanan, Gore, Keyes and LaRouche Declared Eligible for
Primary Matching Funds in 2000 Race (Sept. 30 1999), at http://www.fec.gov/
press/elig999.htm.
79. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 3.
80. 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(2)(A) (2000).
81. See id. § 9004(a)(1).
82. See id.
83. Id. § 9004(a)(2)(A).
84. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 20 (noting that reliance on past electoral
performance can cause problems when third parties lose momentum, as was the case with
the Reform Party during the 2000 election, which was entitled to funding because of Ross
Perot's success in the previous presidential election).
85. See id. at 22.
86. Id.
87. MAURICE DUVERGER, PARTY POLITICS AND PRESSURE GROUPS: A COMPARATIVE
INTRODUCTION 27 (David Wagoner trans., Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1972) (1968).
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two-party system.88 Unlike proportional representation, a party
that wins only a minority of votes in an election gains no repre-
sentatives.8 9 Unlike a run-off system, a minority party cannot
compete on the first ballot secure in the knowledge that if its con-
stituency splinters on that ballot, it can withdraw, or form a cQa-
lition, on the second ballot.9" As a result, voters will be reluctant
to "waste" their votes on minority parties, and minority parties-
or their constituents-will tend to merge with a majority party.9
While Ackerman and Ayres's criticisms are misplaced, the cur-
rent presidential funding system does need reform and, ulti-
mately, expansion to cover congressional races. The presidential
public financing system worked well in the first three elections
held under the system.92 In 1985, the bipartisan Commission on
National Elections reviewed the system and concluded, "[p]ublic
financing of presidential elections has clearly proved its worth in
opening up the process, reducing undue influence of individuals
and groups, and virtually ending corruption in presidential elec-
tion financing."93 Beginning with the 1988 presidential race, how-
ever, soft money fundamentally undermined the system's effec-
tiveness and credibility.94 The soft money ban in the BCRA
addresses this central problem.95 Nevertheless, other major re-
forms are needed to maintain the future viability of the presiden-
tial system.
A recent reform proposal developed by Democracy 21 and
Common Cause would provide for substantially more public fund-
ing, increased overall spending limits, and changes in the timing
of distributions in response to the accelerated primary schedule.96
The reform proposal would also emphasize the need for publicly
88. Id. at 27-28.
89. Id. at 28.
90. Id. at 28-29.
91. Id. at 29.
92. See BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 99-101 (describing the success of the public fi-
nancing system).
93. COMM'N ON NAT'L ELECTIONS, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT: A PROGRAM FOR REFORM
37 (Robert E. Hunter ed., 1986).
94. BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 46.
95. See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 101(a), 116 Stat. 81, 82 (2002) (to be codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)).
96. COMMON CAUSE & DEMOCRACY 21, FIXING THE PRESIDENTIAL PUBLIC FINANCING
SYSTEM 1, 3 (2003).
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funded candidates to compete with privately funded candidates.97
In particular, this proposal would increase the current 1:1 match
on the first $250 of a private contribution during the primary
phase to a 3:1 or 4:1 match on the first $500, cap individual con-
tributions to participating candidates at $500, and increase fund-
ing to finance the program.98 It would also call for substantial in-
crease in the primary and general election overall spending limits
and repeal of the state-by-state spending limits in the primary.99
To take account of the increasingly front-loaded primary sched-
ule, the proposal would distribute primary funding earlier."' In
addition, it would raise the limits for party spending on behalf of
presidential candidates. 10'
C. Disclosure
Current campaign finance law requires candidates, PACs, po-
litical parties, and independent spenders to disclose campaign
contributions and expenditures.' 2 Disclosure requirements, the
Supreme Court has recognized, "aid the voters in evaluating
those who seek federal office,.... [Dlisclosure requirements
[also] deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corrup-
tion by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light
of publicity."03 They also "are an essential means of gathering the
data necessary to detect violations of the contribution limita-
tions."104
Ackerman and Ayres advocate the replacement of disclosure
with mandatory anonymity, under which neither the public nor
the politicians who receive donations would know their source. 05
In advancing their proposal, Ackerman and Ayres criticize the
traditional focus on disclosure.' 6 "[L]ow voter motivation," they
explain, "makes a full-information remedy a profoundly problem-
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id. at 2.
99. Id. at 2-3.
100. Id. at 3-4.
101. Id. at 4.
102. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2000).
103. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976).
104. Id. at 68.
105. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 27-28.
106. Id. at 27.
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atic aspect of the old reform paradigm.... [Ilf most voters pay
scant attention to politics, they won't take the time to go through
the lengthy lists of donors published in the name of 'full informa-
tion. 1 °7 They further reason that disclosure is inadequate be-
cause it amounts at best to 'quasi-full information[ 1,108
Ackerman and Ayres make an effective case about the limits of
disclosure, persuasively rebutting those who advocate disclosure
only as the appropriate regime for campaign finance.1" 9 Ackerman
and Ayres, however, have not made the case for elimination of
disclosure. While disclosure does not prevent a politician from fa-
voring major donors, it constrains such action. Further, disclosure
draws public attention to some of the most serious problems in
campaign finance.110 Public disclosure, for instance, played a key
role in countering soft money."' Until 1991, the FEC did not re-
quire the political parties to disclose soft money spending."2 That
year, in response to legal action brought by Common Cause, the
FEC adopted disclosure rules."' The resulting information helped
fuel the ultimately successful legislative effort to eliminate soft
money." 4
Ultimately, Ackerman and Ayres's argument for eliminating
disclosure turns on their argument that they can prevent the re-
cipient politicians, as well as the public, from knowing the iden-
tity of their donors." 5 As we discuss below, we seriously doubt the
feasibility of this approach." 6
107. Id.
108. Id. at 94 (noting that traditional disclosure "doesn't require publication of...
what the politician and the donor say to one another in the profess of giving and getting.").
109. Id. at 27; see, e.g., Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 29, at 1736-37; Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 326-27 (1998).
110. See BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 46 (exploring the use of soft money); Expert Re-
port of Thomas E. Mann at 11-26, McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-0582 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 27,
2002) (recounting use of soft money), available at http://www.camlc. org/vocacy-court2-
31.html.
111. Id.
112. Id.; Expert Report of Mann at 14, McConnell, No. 02-0582.
113. Id.; see also 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(g)(3) (2002).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 176-83.
115. AcKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 94.
116. See infra Part III.
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D. FEC Reform
In addition to the three elements outlined above, reform of the
FEC is central to the traditional reform program, as it is to Ac-
kerman and Ayres's proposal.'17 As the authors rightly empha-
size, "[t]he current Federal Election Commission is an icon of in-
effectiveness," and "it is essential to design adequate institutions"
to oversee campaign finance reform."' A bipartisan task force
convened in 2001 by Democracy 21 has also concluded that "[n]o
law will be effective if the agency responsible for its enforcement
interprets the law contrary to its basic purposes and intent, ad-
ministratively creates gaping loopholes in the law, and tolerates
widespread evasion of the law."'19
There are three principal flaws in the current FEC, which both
Ackerman and Ayres and traditional reformers target. First, in
many respects, Congress designed the FEC, its own watchdog, to
frustrate effective enforcement. 2 ° Unlike most agencies, which
are either headed by a single administrator or have an odd num-
ber of commissioners, the FEC has six members and requires a
majority to take action.' 2 ' By statute, no more than three of the
commissioners can be members of the same political party.'22 In
practice, it has been composed of three Democrats and three Re-
publicans.'23 This structure, Ackerman and Ayres note, "virtually
guarantee[s] administrative failure on a broad front."2 ' Congress
further imposed awkward and time-consuming enforcement pro-
cedures on the agency, designed, as reported in the Congressional
Quarterly, "to protect incumbents and challengers from overly
aggressive investigators."'25 Under these procedures, the FEC
lacks power in all significant cases to impose sanctions, but in-
117. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 10.
118. Id.
119. No BARK, No BITE, No POINT, supra note 44, at 33. Fred Wertheimer initiated
and served on this task force. Id. at 4.
120. See BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 150.
121. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1), (c) (2000); see also BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 150 ("LOInly
the FEC and the International Trade Commission consist of an even number of commis-
sioners-and the ITC is empowered to act on the affirmative vote of three out of six com-
missioners, whereas four votes are required for FEC action.").
122. 2 U.S.C § 437c(a)(1).
123. See BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 150.
124. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 131.
125. Jackie Koszczuk, Money Woes Leave FEC Watchdog with More Bark than Bite, 56
CONG. Q. 469, 470 (1998).
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stead must enter into a voluntary agreement with the party un-
der review or seek redress in court.126 Before it enters court,
moreover, it must conduct a multi-staged investigation and re-
view process, requiring the concurrence of four commissioners at
three separate stages.127
Second, "[t]he FEC is a classic example of a 'captured' agency-
one that has become attuned to serving the interests of the com-
munity it is supposed to be regulating."12 When Congress first es-
tablished the FEC, it authorized the leaders of Congress to ap-
point four of its six commissioners.1 29 The Supreme Court in
Buckley v. Valeo13 ° struck down this arrangement as a violation of
the President's appointment power, 31 and Congress subsequently
amended the statute to provide for presidential appointment.
13 2
In practice, however, the White House has continued to look to
Congressional leaders to identify nominees for the Commission.133
The resulting commissioners typically have close ties and alle-
giance to incumbent officeholders and the political parties. 34 As a
consequence, Ackerman and Ayres note, "[a]ny proposal that
damages the interests of leading politicians of either party will be
greeted skeptically, and embraced only if it promises to do more
damage to the rival party-in which case it is likely to be vetoed
by the other three-member bloc." 35
Third, Congress has "chronically under-funded" the FEC. 6 As
Ackerman and Ayres observe, "Congress has often used its fiscal
powers as a club to batter agencies into line when they offend
powerful interests."137 This is the case with the FEC. In the words
of former Representative Tony Coehlo, "there's basically been an
126. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i) (2000); see also No BARK, No BITE, supra note 44, at
52.
127. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(2), (a)(4)(A)(i), (5)(C), (6)(A); see also NO BARK, No BITE, su-
pra note 44, at 51.
128. No BARK, No BITE, No POINT, supra note 44, at 15.
129. Id.
130. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
131. Id. at 143.
132. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (2000); see also No BARK, No BITE, supra note 44, at 15.
133. See, e.g., Koszczuk, supra note 125, at 469 ("an informal understanding gives Con-
gress control over who is nominated.").
134. See No BARK, No BITE, NO POINT, supra note 44, at 61.
135. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 130-31.
136. No BARK, No BITE, No POINT, supra note 44, at 20.
137. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 134.
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attempt on the part of people to try to make the FEC noneffective
by withholding money. And they succeeded to a great extent."
138
In November 2001, for instance, 54 out of the 174 cases on the
Commission's docket were unassigned for lack of staff. 39 Accord-
ing to a PricewaterhouseCoopers audit, "[wlith its current level of
resources and escalating workloads, the FEC accomplishes its
disclosure responsibilities, but struggles to meet its compliance
mission.
"14 o
In response to the FEC's widely acknowledged failings, Acker-
man and Ayres propose its replacement by a five-member com-
mission selected exclusively from retired federal judges.14 1 These
judges, the authors reason, are uniquely suited to serve as impar-
tial "watchdogs."1 42 They will "no longer lust after high political
office," but will "seek to ensure that their names receive honor-
able mention in the annals of the republic."44 This "appeal to
fame" will promote independence, for judges
are aware of our great constitutional legacy, and are alive to the
honor that goes with making a genuine contribution to its suste-
nance. They have also been socialized into the cast of mind necessary
for the successful operation of the FEC-cultivating habits of impar-
tiality in the name of the rule of law.
144
To further insulate the judges from political pressure, Ackerman
and Ayres propose their appointment to staggered, nonrenewable
ten-year terms.4 5
Ackerman and Ayres also address the budgetary and enforce-
ment problems of the current FEC. Their proposed commission
138. Joshua Shenk, Designed for Impotence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 20, 1997,
at 30, 32.
139. Federal Election Commission, Statement of Reasons of Commissioner Scott E.
Thomas, (Nov. 9, 2001) (Pre MUR 395), available at http://fecwebl.fec.gov/members/ tho-
mas/thomasstatement39.html.
140. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, TECHNOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE AUDIT AND
MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ES-3 (1999).
141. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 129.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Because of these expected advantages of having retired federal judges serve as
commissioners, the authors conclude that constraining the President to appoint only re-
tired federal judges falls within Congress's authority to "prescrib[e] ... reasonable and
relevant qualifications and rules of eligibility of appointees." Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 129 (1926).
145. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 130.
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includes an independent enforcement division, headed by the
agency's general counsel and separate from the commission's op-
erating divisions.146 The Commission would be funded, like Social
Security, with an enduring appropriations statute rather than
through the annual appropriations process.'47 While Congress
would remain free to alter the appropriations formula, any
changes would "come not during a midnight session on an omni-
bus appropriations measure but after a high-visibility debate-
with a majority taking full responsibility for their votes before
their constituents."148
Traditional reformers have similarly proposed creation of a
new FEC that is more powerful and insulated from Congressional
interference. Under a proposal issued in 2002 by the Democracy
21 bipartisan task force noted above, the FEC would be replaced
by a new independent agency headed by a single administrator, a
model successfully used in other countries.'49 The new agency's
enforcement powers would include the authority to impose penal-
ties directly on violators through adjudication before administra-
tive law judges subject to judicial review. 5 ° The administrator
would serve a ten-year, nonrenewable term and be appointed by
the President subject to Senate confirmation, typically giving
both parties a role in the selection process.' 5' By concentrating re-
sponsibility in a single administrator, this proposal would attract
public attention to the selection and performance of the new
leader, increasing the accountability of the agency and of the ap-
pointment process. 52 The agency would be funded on a multi-year
basis, and Congress would receive nonpartisan recommendations
from the General Accounting Office as to the appropriate funding
level. 153 While the two proposals differ in their particulars, they
reflect common and important objectives.
146. Id. at 132-33.
147. Id. at 135.
148. Id. at 136.
149. No BARK, NO BITE, NO POINT, supra note 44, at 34.
150. Id. at 34.
151. Id. at 37-38.
152. Id. at 35-36.
153. Id. at 43.
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III. THE ACKERMAN AND AYRES PROPOSAL: THE SECRET
DONATION BOOTH
Ackerman and Ayres depart significantly from the traditional
approach in replacing disclosure with mandatory anonymity
through the secret donation booth.154 Under their proposal, all
donations to candidates, political parties, PACs, and groups en-
gaging in express advocacy would be given through the secret do-
nation booth-a blind trust that would keep donors' identity se-
cret from the recipients as well as the public.155 Individuals could
contribute much greater sums to candidates than currently au-
thorized, including up to $100,000 to presidential candidates.'56
While contributors could publicize alleged donations to specific
candidates, they could not, according to Ackerman and Ayres,
prove that they had made these donations.15 The authors analo-
gize their regime to the secret ballot.5 ' The secret ballot, they
reason, enabled voters to falsely profess support for a politician,
"mak[ing] it more difficult for candidates to buy votes.' 1 59 The se-
cret donation booth, they argue, would similarly allow individuals
to falsely assert that they donated money, "mak[ing] it harder for
candidates to sell access or influence." 6 °
Ackerman and Ayres include numerous measures to preserve
the secrecy of their donation booth. To prevent donors from prov-
ing contributions with a cancelled check, for instance, the authors
give all donors the right to obtain a refund of a contribution
within five days of making it.'6' Donors who received refunds
would have the same cancelled checks as true donors, rendering a
cancelled check inconclusive as to whether a donation had been
made. 62 The result of these measures, suggest Ackerman and
Ayres, is that anyone could assert that he or she had made a
large donation, but no one could prove it. 16 In this world of
"cheap talk," Ackerman and Ayres argue, politicians would be
154. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 6.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 117.
157. Id. at 6.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 101.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 104.
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unable to identify their true donors, and thus unable to favor
them.164
While elegant in design, we seriously question the ability of
this model to work in practice.
Buying votes in an election involves a very different calculus
from selling access to politicians, making analogies between the
two of limited use. Vote-buying, by its nature, requires a politi-
cian to verify large numbers of votes, each one of which is insig-
nificant on its own. Access-selling, by contrast, involves a far
smaller network of individuals and can succeed with only a few
verified transactions.
Within this network, many politicians have close relations with
their major donors and supporters. Based on their past contribu-
tion history, professional ties, or common agendas, politicians
would in many cases reasonably believe these donors' assertions
that they had made contributions. These major donors, mean-
while, would have little interest in misleading politicians and
would not consider it worthwhile to undertake the risk or psychic
cost of lying, in part because the amount of the contribution is in
any event often relatively small compared to the potential bene-
fits. As Alan G. Hassenfeld, Chairman of the Board and CEO of
Hasbro, has testified in the litigation regarding the constitution-
ality of the BCRA:
Many in the corporate world view large soft money donations as a
cost of doing business, and frankly, a good investment relative to the
potential economic benefit to their business .... I remain convinced
that in some of the more publicized cases, federal officeholders actu-
ally appear to have sold themselves and the party cheaply. They
could have gotten even more money, because of the potential impor-
tance of their decisions to the affected businesses. 
165
164. Id. at 6.
165. Declaration of Alan G. Hassenfeld 16, McConnell, No. 02-0582, available at
http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-31.html. MIT professors Stephen Ansolabehere,
John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder Jr. argue that the low ratio between the
overall amount of political contributions and the economic stakes of government decision-
making suggests that contributions are given not to gain influence, but for the satisfaction
of participation in its own right. See Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in
U.S. Politics? 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (2003).
That the political contribution market has not reached its full potential size, however, is
in no way inconsistent with the conclusion that many donors, particularly the largest, give
contributions in order to gain influence. Indeed, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder
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Major donors would gain further credibility regarding their as-
serted contributions because Ackerman and Ayres require ulti-
mate disclosure of contributions. 166 To insure against misdirection
of funds, Ackerman and Ayres provide for delayed disclosure of
contributions, with the FEC publishing contributions ten years
after each election.'67 Just as the federal judges that Ackerman
and Ayres target for their commission "will have their eyes on the
history books," 6 8 many large donors, including business leaders,
will have, and will reasonably be presumed to have, concerns
about their reputations. Certain exposure of any lies about con-
tributions even in ten years, would make it far less appealing for
these donors to lie about contributions, and it would lend weight
to their assertions that they had made a contribution.
We also question the efficacy of the many controls Ackerman
and Ayres would impose to keep their blind trust blind.6 9 Cam-
paign finance players have aggressively skirted the current sys-
tem, and Ackerman and Ayres's approach would certainly foster
similar efforts. Even with strict controls, for instance, govern-
ment leaks are difficult to contain, and some information could
come from the FEC officials and staff with access to the database.
In another route of circumvention, donors could provide assur-
ance to politicians by having their accountants certify contribu-
tions. And, while Ackerman and Ayres have designed complex
mechanisms for disbursements from the blind trust to prevent
noticeable jumps in a candidate's receipts that could be tied to a
particular donor,'7 ° it may well underestimate the ingenuity of
the major campaign finance players to believe that they will be
acknowledge that "a subset of donors-mainly corporate and industry PACs-behave as if
they expected favors in return" and that "[tihese contributors may in fact receive a rea-
sonable rate of return-say 20 percent...." Id. at 126. As lobbyist Robert Rozen testified
in the litigation regarding the BCRA, "[wihile some soft money is given for ideological
purposes, companies and trade associations working on public policy for the most part give
to pursue their economic interests." Declaration of Robert Rozen $ 10, McConnell, No. 02-
0582, available at http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-31.html. A survey of 300 business
executives at major U.S. corporations conducted for the Committee on Economic Develop-
ment similarly reported that 75% of these executives said that "political donations give
them an advantage in shaping legislation," and 78% "called the system 'an arms race for
cash that continues to get more and more out of control.'" Declaration of Charles E.M. Kolb
9, McConnell, No. 02-0582, available at http://www.camlc.orgladvocacy-court2-31.html.
166. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 99.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 131.
169. See id. at 99-100.
170. Id. at 104-07.
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unable to defeat these mechanisms. Unlike vote buying schemes,
which generally require a large number of improper transactions
to affect the outcome, even a small number of contributors break-
ing through Ackerman and Ayres's controls could significantly
undermine the system.
Ackerman and Ayres's proposal to keep secret the financial
backers of independent campaign spending faces additional ob-
stacles. Here, as with contributions to candidates, Ackerman and
Ayres propose to channel contributions to organizations to fund
express advocacy through a blind trust.17' Even assuming these
groups could not prove the identity of specific individual donors,
they could persuasively signal their general source of funding.
Tort lawyers, for instance, could fund their own express advocacy
organization. Even without establishing their contributors, they
could prove to candidates that tort lawyers as a group had fi-
nanced a powerful campaign in aid of, or in opposition to, a par-
ticular candidate. Such campaigns would enable tort lawyers, and
similar groups, to gain influence over candidates, notwithstand-
ing the secret donation booth.
The public, as well as politicians, could identify the backers of
such independent campaigns. With respect to individual dona-
tions, however, politicians would be unlikely to publicize any in-
formation they learned about their donors. If politicians knew the
identity of particular major donors, but the public did not, politi-
cians could readily favor those donors without political conse-
quences. No public information would lead the media or the elec-
torate to scrutinize these governmental actions.
The absence of public disclosure would also undermine en-
forcement of many aspects of Ackerman and Ayres's proposal, in-
cluding the elements of current campaign finance law that they
retain. With the blind trust, the public would have no way of
monitoring compliance with these aspects-including Ackerman
and Ayres's ban on union, corporate, and non-citizen contribu-
tions; 72 their overall contribution limits; '73 and their rules re-
stricting PAC contributions of private money to candidates.'74 En-
forcement of these rules would have to be trusted entirely to the
FEC, outside the check of public scrutiny-a disturbing prospect.
171. See id. at 125-26.
172. Id. at 205-05 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10(h)).
173. Id. at 203-04 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10(c)-(e)).
174. Id. at 203 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10(b)).
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Ackerman and Ayres are correct that the current system of
campaign finance regulation has serious problems. These prob-
lems, however, are not due to inherent problems with the tradi-
tional approach, taken as a whole. Instead, they result from the
FEC's chronic underenforcement and Congress's reluctance to es-
tablish a strong and effective system. The 2002 passage of the
BCRA represents an important step to counter these trends. We
discuss it below.
IV. BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT
BCRA responds to the emergence of a "shadow" campaign fi-
nance system, in which large individual contributors, corpora-
tions, and unions have directed massive funds to federal elections
outside the federal campaign finance laws by donating soft money
to the parties and sponsoring unregulated "issue ads" designed to
influence elections. This shadow system bypassed the current
system of campaign finance control, as it would bypass Ackerman
and Ayres's regime. Because the BCRA's reforms are needed to
make any system of campaign finance function effectively, we dis-
cuss their constitutionality in some detail. 175
A. Soft Money: The Parties
A central part of the new law is the soft money ban.'76 Soft
money is money the parties have raised and spent outside the re-
strictions of federal campaign finance law.177 The parties have
raised soft money on the theory that they use it to influence
state-rather than federal-elections. It is widely acknowledged,
however, that the parties have used it to target federal elections.
175. The authors are on the legal team representing the congressional sponsors of the
BCRA as defendant-intervenors in the litigation currently reviewing the constitutionality
of the new legislation. See McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-0582 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 27, 2002).
This discussion draws on the defendant-interveners' and the government's briefs in the
case and on the extensive evidence presented in the case.
176. See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 101(a), 116 Stat. 81, 82 (2002) (to be codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)).
177. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 45 ("Existing law bans big contributions
to candidates but permits big gifts to political parties. So big givers take advantage of this
loophole to channel vast sums to the parties, which can legally spend the money for a host
of activities that benefit their favored candidates."); Expert Report of Mann at 11-26,
McConnell, No. 02-0582.
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Any campaign finance system that regulates the source or
amount of money that can be used for federal campaigns must
grapple with the soft money problem and the role of political par-
ties in elections. It must, in other words, ensure that money for-
bidden to be used in federal elections is not channeled through
the political parties to benefit federal candidates. The BCRA does
so by banning soft money, and Ackerman and Ayres "endorse
[this] effort to sweep soft-money contributions to political parties
into the regulatory framework.""17 Their model statute similarly
"treats all political parties as their candidates' alter egos, and re-
quires all their campaign expenditures to come through the secret
donation booth."
179
Ackerman and Ayres vouch for the constitutionality of the soft
money ban.8 ° We agree.
The soft money ban is justified on two separate bases identified
by the Supreme Court as appropriate grounds to restrict contri-
butions.8 ' First, it prevents circumvention of the rules-already
upheld-that restrict contributions to candidates and to political
parties for the purposes of influencing federal elections.'82 Second,
it prevents corruption and the appearance of corruption.8 3 We
discuss each basis in turn.
1. Preventing Circumvention
Since Buckley, the Court has repeatedly upheld contribution
limits designed to prevent evasion of the limits on contributions
to candidates. 184 The soft money ban does precisely that.
178. Id. at 54.
179. Id. at 124.
180. See id. at 54, 125.
181. See FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441, 456
(2001).
182. Id. at 456.
183. Id. at 441.
184. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court upheld the $25,000 annual ag-
gregate limit on individual contributions in the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA")
because it prevented evasion of the FECA's basic $1,000 contribution limit. Id. at 38; see
also Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 456 ("circumvention is a
valid theory of corruption"); California Med. Ass'n. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 198 (1981) (up-
holding the $5,000 limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees because
contribution limits upheld in Buckley otherwise "could be easily evaded").
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Soft money is money raised by the parties outside the federal
restrictions; it includes individual donations that exceed the con-
tribution limits as well as direct contributions from corporations
and unions."8 5 The theory of soft money, and the basis on which
the FEC authorized it in rulings issued in 1978 and 1979, is that
it relates to nonfederal elections.'86 Ostensibly, the parties use it
for the nonfederal "portion" of activities, such as get-out-the-vote
("GOTV") efforts, that affect both federal and nonfederal elec-
tions. Contrary to this theory, however, the parties have targeted
soft money at the presidential and key congressional races, using
it to finance advertising about named federal candidates, GOTV
efforts, and other activities in states facing competitive federal
elections.'87 Indeed, even the academic expert retained by the
plaintiffs challenging the BCRA agreed that the "[n]ational par-
ties allocate soft money to state organizations primarily with the
intent to help federal candidates in close races," and that the par-
ties "exploit federal campaign finance laws by using soft money
for candidate support even though federal laws require them to
use it for generic party building."'
The state parties have played a key role in this circumvention
by spending soft money transferred from the national parties.
"The national parties exerted firm control over the ways in which
soft money was spent," and "[t]he primary goal" of this spending
"was to support the election of federal, not nonfederal, candi-
dates."'89 In the 2000 election cycle, for instance, the national par-
ties transferred more than $240 million in soft money to state and
local parties, principally for the purpose of influencing federal
elections through "issue ads," GOTV, and similar activities.' 90
The soft money ban in the BCRA responds to this large-scale
circumvention with three elements. First, it requires the national
parties to raise and spend only hard money.' 9 Second, because of
185. See BRIFFAULT, supra note 48, at 124, 126.
186. See id. at 127.
187. See id.
188. Ray La Raja, American Political Parties in the Era of Soft Money 74-75 (2001)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (attached to La Raja
Cross Exam. Tr. at Ex. 3, McConnell, No. 02-0582).
189. Expert Report of Mann at 16, McConnell, No. 02-0582.
190. FEC, National Party Transfers to States, at http://www.fec.gov/press/051501party
fund/tables/nat2state.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
191. See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 101(a), 116 Stat. 81, 82 (2002) (to be codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)).
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the extensive role state parties played in directing soft money to
federal races, it requires the state parties to spend only hard
money, or a specified mixture of hard money and limited soft
money, on "federal election activit[ies]."192 Third, it prohibits fed-
eral candidates and officeholders, as well as national party offi-
cials, from raising soft money.193 Congress enacted these meas-
ures to prevent the parties from raising money to influence
federal elections outside the federal campaign finance system,
and these anticircumvention measures should be upheld accord-
ingly.
2. Preventing Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption
The Supreme Court of the United States has long upheld con-
tribution restrictions, such as the soft money ban, on the grounds
that they prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption.194
Under Buckley and subsequent cases, Congress may enact contri-
bution limits not simply to counter acts of bribery and quid pro
quo corruption, but also to prevent less "blatant and specific at-
tempts of those with money to influence governmental action,"19
including the risk that large contributions will exert an "undue
influence on an officeholder's judgment, [or] the appearance of
such influence." 96
192. Id. sec. 101(a), 116 Stat. at 82. The statute defines "federal election activit[ies]" as:
(1) voter registration activity during the 120 days immediately before a regularly sched-
uled federal election; (2) voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activity con-
ducted in connection with an election in which a candidate for federal office is on the bal-
lot; (3) public communications that promote, support, attack, or oppose a clearly identified
candidate for federal office; and (4) the services of state party employees who spend more
than 25 percent of their time on activities in connection with a federal election. Id. §
101(b), 116 Stat. at 85-86.
Under the Levin Amendment, named for its sponsor, state parties may use soft money
to pay for an allocated part of the expense of "[flederal election activity," so long as the ac-
tivity does not refer to a clearly identified candidate for federal office, the funds are not
used for certain broadcast communications, and the funds are raised directly by the state
or local party in increments of $10,000 or less-these funds are known as "Levin funds."
Id. § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 83.
193. See id. § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 84.
194. See FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976).
195. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.
196. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 441; see also Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Gov't Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) ("Leave the per-
ception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption that large donors call the
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The Court in Buckley reasoned that "the reality or appearance
of corruption" is "inherent in a system permitting unlimited fi-
nancial contributions."'97 The soft money experience confirms that
conclusion. While some have argued that party fundraising does
not create the same risk of corruption as direct candidate fund-
raising, the evidence belies this claim, and the Supreme Court
has upheld limits on contributions to parties. 98 Indeed, "[m]uch of
the soft money raised for political parties is raised by elected offi-
cials-sitting members of the Senate and the House of Represen-
tatives."199 Federal officeholders head and constitute the members
of four of the six national party committees-the House and Sen-
ate campaign committees. 20 0 The sitting President typically exer-
cises substantial control over the fifth-the Republican or Democ-
ratic National Committee.20 ' As a result, "[p]arty committees do
not so much dilute and 'cleanse' private interest money as cen-
tralize it and focus it on the President and the congressional
leadership."202
When party officials, rather than federal candidates and office-
holders, raise the funds, the "party's involvement does not steril-
ize the system.""2 3 As the Supreme Court has recognized, parties
"act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce
obligated officeholders."20 4 Therefore, "substantial donations turn
the parties into matchmakers whose special [interest] meetings
and receptions give the donors the chance to get their points
across to the candidates;"2 5 and donors "can use parties as con-
duits for contributions meant to place candidates under obliga-
tion."20 6 Evidence obtained in the BCRA litigation bolsters these
conclusions. A fundraising letter from former Republican Chair-
tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.").
197. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added).
198. See id. at 38 (upholding the overall yearly limit of $25,000 on contributions by an
individual, recognizing that this limit will preclude "huge contributions to [a] candidate's
political party").
199. Declaration of Senator Rudman 6, McConnell, No. 02-0582, available at http:/!
www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-31.html.
200. See id.
201. See Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 620, 651 (2000).
202. Id.
203. Declaration of Senator Rudman 12, McConnell, No. 02-0582.
204. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 452 (2001).
205. Id. at 461.
206. Id. at 452.
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man Jim Nicholson to the chief executive of Bristol-Myers Squibb,
for example, advised, "[wle must keep the lines of communication
open if we want to continue passing legislation that will benefit
your industry."2 °7 A "call sheet" written to prepare former Democ-
ratic Chairman Don Fowler to make a fundraising call to a Senior
Texaco official directed Fowler to request a $35,000 donation
while noting presidential support of the "Oil Industry" on pending
legislation: "The President helped out the Oil Industry by sup-
porting them on drilling issues in the Gulf of Mexico. The bill
passed the House on Tuesday.""'
Additional evidence gathered in the BCRA litigation shows soft
money fundraising results not only in the appearance, but also
the actuality, of undue influence. As former Senator Warren
Rudman testified, "[1]arge soft money contributions in fact distort
the legislative process."2" 9 In the words of former Senator and Re-
publican Whip Alan Simpson, "[d]onations from the tobacco in-
dustry to Republicans scuttled tobacco legislation, just as contri-
butions from the trial lawyers to Democrats stopped tort
reform."210 Former Senator Paul Simon described an incident
when Federal Express, which had reportedly contributed close to
$1 million in soft money to the political parties, sought an
amendment to certain legislation during the 1995-1996 Ses-
sion."' When Senator Simon opposed the amendment in the De-
mocratic Caucus, one of his senior colleagues responded that
"we've got to pay attention to who is buttering our bread." '212
Soft money also fosters the widespread appearance of corrup-
tion, itself sufficient to justify the ban. As the Court has ex-
plained, Congress has authority to restrict contributions to pre-
vent even the appearance of corruption, lest "'confidence in the
system of representative Government ... be eroded to a disas-
207. Letter from Jim Nicholson, RNC Chairman, to Charles Heimbold, Chairman Bris-
tol-Myers (Apr. 9, 1999), available at http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-47.html.
208. DNC Finance Call Sheet for Jim Broninger, Texaco, Nov. 10, 1995, available at
http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-47.html.
209. Declaration of Senator Rudman 9, McConnell, No. 02-0582, available at
http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-31.html.
210. Declaration of Alan K. Simpson 1 10, McConnell, No. 02-0582, available at
http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-31.html.
211. Declaration of Paul Simon 13, McConnell, No. 02-0582, available at
http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-31.html.
212. Id. 1 14; see also FEC v. Colorado Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 451 n.12
(2001).
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trous extent.' 213 A poll conducted by a bipartisan team of leading
pollsters and presented to the court reviewing the BCRA re-
ported: "[t]he American public believes [that] [tihe views of large
contributors to parties improperly influence policy and are given
undue weight in determining policy outcomes."21 4 Among other
conclusions, the poll found that that seventy-one percent of
Americans believe that "members of Congress sometimes decide
how to vote ... based on what big contributors to their political
party want, even if it is not what most people in their district
want, or even if it's not what they think is best for the country."
21 5
B. Electioneering by Interest Groups, Corporations, and Unions
The second area of shadow campaign finance involves cam-
paign spending by interest groups, corporations, and unions.
Campaign finance law has long included this activity within its
regulatory framework. Largely since 1996, however, these groups
have evaded this framework by running "sham" issue ads that es-
cape regulation and by coordinating their ostensibly independent
spending with candidates.216 As with soft money, these maneu-
vers allowed these groups to operate outside the campaign fi-
nance laws.21 7 Importantly, these tactics would allow identical
evasion of Ackerman and Ayres's system, making an effective re-
sponse as critical to their system as to the traditional framework.
Indeed, Ackerman and Ayres recognize this need, tracking the
traditional approach in important respects. Current law prohibits
corporations and unions from spending their general treasury
funds on campaign activities, requiring them to use only money
in PACs financed by their individual constituents.218 Ackerman
and Ayres adopt this restriction."9 Current law included inde-
213. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n
v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
214. MARK MELLMAN & RICHARD WIRTHLIN, RESEARCH FINDINGS OF A TELEPHONE
STUDY AMONG 1300 ADuLT AMERICANS 5 (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.
camlc.org/advocacy-court2-31.html.
215. Id. at 7.
216. See infra text accompanying notes 240-47; see also, e.g., Thomas E. Mann & Nor-
man J. Ornstein, Not a Danger to Free Speech, WASH. POST, July 14, 1998, at A15.
217. See id.
218. 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.1(a)(2)(iii), 114.2(b) (2002).
219. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 204-05 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10(h)).
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pendent campaign spending by individuals and groups other than
corporations and unions within the regulatory framework, requir-
ing disclosure of this spending.22 ° Ackerman and Ayres also incor-
porate campaign spending in their regime requiring it to be
funded through the secret donation booth.22' Finally, current law
treats interest group spending that is coordinated with a candi-
date like a direct contribution to that candidate,222 and the FEC,
pursuant to BCRA, has issued new regulations to enforce this
provision.223 Ackerman and Ayres similarly emphasize the need
"to create an effective barrier against coordination with the can-
didate," recognizing that "[ilf candidates can create organizations
that masquerade as independents but function as integral parts
of their campaign, they will no longer encourage givers to use the
blind trust."224
Ackerman and Ayres reject, however, another key measure of
the BCRA that responds to shadow activity by corporations, un-
ions, and interest groups.225 This measure responds to the rise of
sham issue ads since 1996.226 These sham issue ads exploited the
rule adopted in Buckley, discussed in detail below, that treats an
ad by spenders other than candidates and political committees,
including political parties, as a campaign ad only if it uses words
of "express advocacy."227 The BCRA displaces this express advo-
cacy test for the periods close to an election, redefining the types
of advertisements that are treated as campaign advertisements
during these periods.22 Under the new standard, an ad is a cam-
paign ad if it clearly identifies a federal candidate within thirty
days of a primary or sixty days of a general election and is tar-
geted to the candidate's constituency.22 9
220. 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.1(b)(1), 109.2(a) (2002).
221. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 199 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(a)).
222. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 202, 116 Stat. 81, 90-91 (2002) (to be codified at 2
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)).
223. Id. sec. 214(c), 116 Stat. at 95; Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68
Fed. Reg. 421 (Jan. 3, 2003). Congressional sponsors of the BCRA have challenged these
regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act on the ground that they fail to im-
plement the legislation properly. Shays v. FEC, No. 02-1984 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 8, 2002).
224. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 123.
225. Id. at 54; see also BCRA sec. 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88-90.
226. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976).
227. See infra text accompanying notes 236-47
228. BCRA sec. 201, 116 Stat. at 89.
229. Id.
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Ackerman and Ayres argue that this redefinition of campaign
ads "restrains free speech."23 ° We disagree. The BCRA does not
ban any form of speech. It simply applies the funding and disclo-
sure rules that have long governed campaign ads to a redefined
set of campaign ads, carefully delineated by Congress to take ac-
count of recent campaign advertising practices and targeted at
ads aimed at influencing elections.
The funding restrictions associated with classification as a
campaign ad are longstanding. These rules prohibit corporations
and unions from financing campaign ads with treasury funds,
while leaving them free to use their PACs-which are voluntarily
funded by their individual constituents-to finance these ads.231
The rules place no restriction on other groups or individuals, but
simply require them to disclose their spending and the source of
these funds.232 The Court has upheld these disclosure rules and
restrictions on corporate spending.2 33 As the Court explained in
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,234 the restriction
on corporate spending prevents distortion of the "political mar-
ketplace" by countering "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to
the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."235
230. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 54.
231. 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.1(a)(2)(iii), 114.2(b) (2002).
232. Id. §§ 109.1(b)(1), 109.2(a).
233. The Court upheld the disclosure requirements in Buckley, reasoning that they "in-
crease[ ] the fund of information concerning those who support the candidates" and "fur-
ther[ I First Amendment values by opening the basic process of our federal election system
to public view." 424 U.S. 1, 81-82 (1976).
234. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
235. Id. at 659-60. The Court has not expressly addressed the analagous restriction on
union spending, but has given no reason to believe that it would treat that restriction
differently from the corporate restriction.
Opponents have argued that the BCRA's restrictions on corporate spending burden
"citizens groups." See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H5456 (daily ed. July 14, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Chenoweth). The Supreme Court, however, has already addressed the permissibility
of imposing the corporate restrictions on nonprofit corporations, and its decision applies
under the BCRA as under previous law. In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479
U.S. 238 (1986), in particular, the Supreme Court ruled that nonprofit corporations that
are formed to promote political ideas and do not accept corporate or union money must be
excepted from the rule requiring corporations to make campaign expenditures through
PACs. Id. at 263-64. This exception continues to apply to the BCRA's new definition of
campaign ads. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(d)(1). Accordingly, under the BCRA, nonprofit advo-
cacy groups that do not accept corporate or union money can spend unlimited funds on the
newly defined campaign ads-they simply have to disclose the spending. See id. §
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Before the BCRA, the line between campaign ads, which may
be regulated, and issue ads, which may not, was that drawn by
the Supreme Court in Buckley." 6 When the Court decided Buck-
ley, Congress had enacted a statute that drew an impermissibly
vague line between campaign and issue ads.237 Rather than in-
validating the statute, the Court drew a line of its own-ruling
that ads by independent spenders would be treated as campaign
ads if they "expressly advocated" the election or defeat of a candi-
date.238 In the well-known "magic words" footnote, the Court ex-
plained that this definition would cover communications "contain-
ing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote
for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,'
'vote against,' 'defeat,' [and] 'reject."'239 In adopting this test, the
Court in Buckley never said the express advocacy line was the
only constitutionally permissible line; it simply adopted this line
to preserve a statute that had failed to offer sufficient precision.
The express advocacy line worked reasonably well for two dec-
ades, because most corporations, unions, and other organizations
complied with the intent of this test.24 ° Starting with the 1996
election, however, these groups have exploited the express advo-
cacy test by broadcasting ads that did not use the "magic words"
but were plainly designed and perceived to support or oppose a
candidate.241 A typical ad opposing Arkansas Senate candidate
Winston Bryant, for instance, closed: "Winston Bryant: govern-
ment waste, political junkets, soft on crime. Call Winston Bryant
and tell him to give the money back."242
Using negative issue ads, the American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO") in 1996
114.10(e)(2). Nonprofit corporations that do accept corporate or union money, of course,
are appropriately subject to the restrictions to prevent them from serving as conduits for
prohibited corporate and union giving. See id. § 114.10(c)(2).
236. See 424 U.S. at 44.
237. The statute sought to regulate expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candi-
date" and to require disclosure of spending "for the purpose of... influencing" an election.
Id. at 39, 77.
238. Id. at 44, 80.
239. Id. at 44 n.52
240. Expert Report of Jonathan S. Krasno & Frank J. Sorauf, Evaluating the Biparti-
san Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) at 50, McConnell, No. 02-0582, available at
http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-31.html.
241. See Mann & Ornstein, supra note 216, at A15.
242. 144 CONG. REC. H5456 (daily ed. July 14, 1998) (statement of Rep. Meehan).
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launched a campaign against selected Republican incumbents in
the House.243 Corporate interests soon responded with an ad cam-
paign run by a grouip calling itself "The Coalition: Americans
Working for Real Change"-whose founders included the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufac-
turers.244 Both groups spent millions of dollars on advertisements
targeting key Congressional races.24 The "express advocacy" test
was no hindrance to these campaigns.24 As the AFL-CIO's politi-
cal director acknowledged, "[ilf somebody handed me a magic
wand and said there is no election law, I would do exactly what I
am doing now." '247
In response to these developments, Congress adopted the new
line defining campaign ads in the BCRA.2 8 Congress's new test
provides clear guidance and it is well aimed at ads with an elec-
tioneering purpose.24 Indeed, contrary to opponents' charges that
the law is overbroad, comprehensive studies of interest-group ad-
vertising provide strong evidence that the BCRA's definition tar-
gets and covers ads that are aimed at influencing elections.2 50
These studies found that interest group advertisements mention-
ing candidates are heavily concentrated in the weeks leading up
to the election, signifying that the interest group choice to men-
tion a candidate is tied to a goal to influence the election." 1 For
example, Citizens for Better Medicare, a group funded by the
pharmaceutical industry, ran more than 23,000 ads during the
first nine months of 2000 without mentioning a candidate.252 In
the two months preceding the election, it ran more than 10,000
243. Frank Swoboda, AFL-CIO to Target 75 House Districts, WASH. POST, Jan. 25,
1996, at A16.
244. Diana Kunde, Reorganized Labor: New AFL-CIO Leaders Try To Give Ailing
Movement a Lift, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 1, 1996, at 1J.
245. Phillip Dine, Labor, Business Groups Battle, Try To Advance Their Agenda, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 1996, at 20A.
246. See Adam Clymer, System Governing Election Spending Found in Shambles, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 1996, at Al.
247. Id. (quoting Steven Rosenthal).
248. See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 201(a), 116 Stat. 81, 89 (2002) (to be codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)).
249. See id.
250. Expert Report of Krasno & Sorauf at 60-61, McConnell (No. 02-0582).
251. Id. at 57. In 2000, 78-85% of interest group ads referring to candidates ran in the
60 days before the election. Expert Report of Kenneth M. Goldstein at 17-18, McConnell,
No. 02-0582, available at http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-31.html.
252. Expert Report of Goldstein at app. tbl. 17A, McConnell, No. 02-0582.
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ads mentioning candidates. 253 The studies also found that interest
group ads mentioning candidates are concentrated in the states
and congressional districts with competitive elections, further
signaling an electioneering purpose.254
In addition to this objective evidence, studies asking viewers to
determine whether the purpose of an ad is "to provide informa-
tion about or urge action on a bill or issue" or "to generate sup-
port or opposition for a particular candidate" found that, of all
airings of interest-group ads during 2000 that were perceived as
genuine issue ads, only 3.1% would have been covered by the
BCRA.255 Similarly, in 1998, only 6.1% of genuine issue ads would
have been covered by the BCRA.256
As this evidence shows, the BCRA's new definition carefully
targets campaign ads. The Buckley definition, by contrast, fails to
capture most ads aimed at elections.5 7 Indeed, candidates gener-
ally avoid express advocacy words in their own ads.25 As a vet-
eran media consultant testified in the BCRA litigation: "In the
modern world of 30 second political advertisements, it is rarely
advisable to use such clumsy words as 'vote for' or 'vote
against.'... All advertising professionals understand that the
most effective advertising leads the viewer to his or her own con-
clusion without forcing it down their throat.""25 Drawing on this
insight, unions, corporations, and interest groups have shown
that it is painless to craft advertisements that skirt the express
advocacy standard while furthering their electioneering purposes.
Without a redefinition of campaign ads, any restriction on cam-
paign advertising by independent spenders-including Ackerman
and Ayres's rule requiring it to be funded through the secret do-
nation booth-will be substantially irrelevant.
The Court, therefore, should uphold this new definition in light
of: (1) the manifest failure of the express advocacy test; (2) the
253. Id.
254. Id. at 20. In the last sixty days before the 2000 election, for instance, 85-90% of
interest group ads referring to candidates for the House or the Senate aired in competitive
districts or states. Id. at 20-24.
255. Id. at 24-25, 27.
256. Expert Report of Krasno & Sorauf at 60 & app. C, McConnell, No. 02-0582.
257. Expert Report of Goldstein at 16, McConnell, No. 02-0582.
258. See id. (11.4% of candidate ads in 2000 used express advocacy).
259. Declaration of Douglas L. Bailey T 3, McConnell, No. 02-0582, available at http:ll
www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-31.html.
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evidence suggesting that Congress's new definition of campaign
advertising for ads running close to an election is appropriately
targeted at ads with an electioneering purpose; and (3) the rea-
sonably modest restrictions that classification as a campaign ad-
vertisement now entails.
V. CONCLUSION
Ackerman and Ayres offer an important perspective on cam-
paign finance reform, and pinpoint many of the current system's
failings. They wrongly argue, however, that these failings are in-
herent in the traditional model of campaign finance reform. To
the contrary, weak enforcement and a reluctant Congress are the
forces that undermine the current system, and they would
equally imperil Ackerman and Ayres's proposal. The BCRA in-
cludes key strengthening measures. Reform of the FEC and of thepresidential funding system, and, ultimately, expansion of the
public funding system to all federal races, will help restore the in-
tegrity of our democracy.
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